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IMMIGRATION LAW

SUMMARY

FLORES v. MEESE:
INS' BLANKET DETENTION
OF MINORS INVALIDATED
1.

INTRODUCTION

In Flores v. Meese, 1 a sharply divided en banc panel of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an Immigration &
Naturalization Service (INS) policy3 requiring detention of suspected illegal alien children during the pendency of deportation
hearings. This policy was mandated by the INS unless the child
had an adult relative or a legal guardian available to assume custody. 3 Minors with a responsible adult, who was neither a parent nor a legal guardian, available to assume custody and to
ensure the minor's appearance at deportation hearings were
1. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per Schroeder,
J.,with whom Nelson, J., Canby, J., and Thompson, J. join; concurring, Tang, J.;
concurring, Norris, J.; concurring in part and dissenting in part, Rymer, J.; dissenting, Wallace, C.J.,joined by Wigliins, J., Brunetti, J., and Leavy, J.) (petition for cert.
filed sub nom. Barr v. Flores, 91-905 (Dec. 9, 1991)).
2. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1356. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1988). This code pI:ovides in
pertinent part:
Juveniles shall be released, in order of preference to: (i) A parent; (ii) legal guardian; or (iii) adult relative (brother, sister,
aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are not presently in INS
detention ... (4) In unusual and compelling circumstances
and at the discretion of the district director or chief patrol
agent, a juvenile may be released to an adult, other than
those (previously identified), who executes an agreement
to care for the juvenile's well-being and to ensure the juvenile's presence at all future proceedings before the INS or an
immigration judge.ld.
3. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1354-1358.
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eligible to be released only at the INS' discretion.· The court held
this blanket detention policy to be unconstitutional. 6
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

FACTS

Congress delegated the authority to determine deportation
policies to the Attorney General. s In 1963, the Attorney General
promulgated regulations providing that aliens who had been
arrested on suspicion of deportability could be released, pending a guarantee to appear at future proceedings, if it was
deemed appropriate by the INS.? Under these regulations an
alien was entitled, upon request, to have a hearing with an
immigration judge to determine his eligibility for release. 8
In 1984, the Western Region of the INS approved a separate
release policy for minors, proclaiming minors would only be
released to a parent or a legal guardian. 9 The INS asserted the
limits on release were necessary to both protect the minor's welfare and safety, and to shield the INS from possible legal liability.lo The new policy permitted the release of suspected
4. Id. at 1354.
5. Id. at 1365.
6. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress was given the
power to regulate immigration under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4. In 8 U.S.C. 1103 (a),
Congress delegated the administrative duties regarding immigration laws to the Attorney
General, who oversees the work of the INS. Id .
. The relevant statutory provision addressing the release or deportation of aliens
is 8 U.S.C. 1252 (a)(l) which provides in pertinent part:
Pending a determination of deportability ... [an] alien may,
upon warrant of the Attorney General, be arrested and
taken into custody ... [A]ny such alien ... may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending such final determination of deportability, [either] (A) be continued in custody;
or (B) be released under bond ... containing such conditions
as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (C) be released on
conditional parole. Id.
7. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (c)(2) which provides in pertinent part: "When serving the warrant of arrest and when determining any application pertaining thereto, the authorized officer shall furnish [the alien] with a notice
of decision ... indicating whether custody will be continued or terminated, specifying any conditions under which release is permitted ... " Id.
8. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (d) which states in pertinent part:
"[A]t a time before a deportation order becomes final, upon application by [the alien]
... an Immigration Judge may ... continue to detain ... or release from custody [the
alien] ... " Id.
9. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355.
10. Id.
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alien children to other competent adults only in unusual and
extraordinary cases, and at the discretion of a District Director or
Chief Patrol Agent. ll The INS attributed the regulation to the dramatic increase in the number of minor aliens found unaccompanied by either a parent, or an adult relative. 12 The INS, though,
introduced no record of previous harm to released children, nor did
it reveal an occasion where liability was incurred as a result of
harm inflicted upon a minor released to an unrelated third party. 13
Despite the large number of objections generated by the
Western Region policy,14 the INS nationalized the policy during the course of this litigation. 16 In implementing the policy,
the INS acknowledged that the principal factor in determining
release or detention of adults was whether the person involved
was likely to appear at future hearings. 16 The INS maintained
the purpose for the blanket detention policy of minors was not
related to either an issue of a possible risk of flight by the alien,
nor to any provision of immigration laws. 17 The INS claimed the
principal justification for the new detention policy was the safety of the minors. IS Since the INS did not have the sufficient
resources nor the expertise needed to complete a comprehensive home study of each proposed custodian, it was reluctant
11.Id.
12. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355-1356. See 53 Fed. Reg. 17,449 (May 17, 1988)
which states in pertinent part:
Since 1980 the INS has witnessed a dramatic increase in the
number of juvenile aliens it encounters ... In most cases the
juvenile is not accompanied by a parent, legal guardian or
other adult relative. Id. As with adults, the decision of whether
to detain or release a juvenile depends on the likelihood that
the alien will appear for all future proceedings. Id. However
with respect to juveniles a determination must also be made
as to whose custody the juvenile should be released. Id. On the
one hand, the concern for the welfare of the juvenile will not
permit release to just any adult. Id. On the other hand, the
Service has neither the expertise nor the resources to conduct
home studies for placement of each juvenile released ... Id.
13. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355.
14. Id. Groups objecting to the INS policy included Amnesty International,
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, International Human Rights Law Group, and
Defense for Children International. Id. KIt is hard to imagine litigants more sympathetic than Jenny Flores, who was 15 years old in 1985 when she was arrested. She
had been sent north by her parents in El Salvador only to find that the U.S. authorities would not release her to her uncle in Texas: Gail Diane Cox and Joan M.
Cheever, Children's Crusade; The INS Loses A Pivotal Case On Alien Youths, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 2, 1991, at 1.
15. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355-1356.
16. Id. at 1356. See supra note 12.
17. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1356.
18.Id.
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to release any minor to an unrelated third party. 19 The INS
did not elucidate any justification for its assumption that
home studies were necessary, nor did it indicate whether
comprehensive home studies were conducted before promulgation of this policy.20 Instead, the INS insisted that the vagueness of the regulation was essential since it gave INS officials
the broadest possible discretion in determining whether detention was required. 21
B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs filed this action challenging the Western
Region's policy of detaining suspected alien children. 22 The
plaintiffs represented a class of children who did not pose a risk
of flight, were not a threat to the community, and had responsible adult third parties available to take temporary custody
of them. 23 Thus, the only reason given by the INS for the plaintiffs' detention was no adult relative, nor legal guardian was
available to assume the minor's custody.24
The plaintiffs asserted the INS policy regarding detention
of minors violated the Immigration & Nationality Act26, their
Fifth Amendment right of due process,26 and their Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantee. 27 The plaintiffs further
challenged the INS' failure to provide prompt written notice to
the detainee describing whether bond release conditions had
been imposed. 28Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed they were
denied a prompt, mandatory, neutral and detached review
19. Id. at 1356-1357. See supra note 12.
20. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1356.
21. Id. See supra note 12.
22. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1991).
23. Id. at 1357.
24.Id.
25. Id. (citing Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991,995 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended».
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Administrative Procedure Act (APA); 5 U.S.C. § 552.
26. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357 (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». U.S.
CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " Id.
27. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357 (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV §1 provides in pertinent part:
-... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person oflife,liberty,
or property, without due process oflaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
28. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357 (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended».
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following arrest. 29 The plaintiffs asserted the review was
necessary to determine whether probable cause originally
existed for the arrest, whether the bond condition was necessary to ensure future appearances, and whether any available
adult was suitable to protect the well-being of the minor, as well
as to ensure the minor's appearance at future hearings. so
The District Court declared the INS provisions to be in violation of the plaintiffs' equal protection rights, and the plaintiffs were granted summary judgment. S ! The defendants
appealed to a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. S2 The
majority of the panel vacated the first paragraph of the District
Court decision and held the detention policy did not adversely affect any of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights. ss The panel
decided the INS should be given deferential treatment in
implementing its policy.s, The panel also remanded the third
paragraph of the District Court order,S6 and decided the appropriate model for evaluating procedural due process should be
the balancing test described in Mathews v. EldridgeS6 , rather
29. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357. (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended».
30. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357. (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended».
31. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357-1358. The District Court order provided:
(1). Defendants ... shall release any minor otherwise eligible for release on bond or recognizance to his parents,
guardian, custodian, conservator, or other responsible adult
party. Id. at 1357. Prior to any such release, the defendants
may require from such persons a written promise to bring
such minor before the appropriate officer or court when
requested by the INS. Id .. at 1357-1358.
(2). Whenever a minor is released as 8roresaid, the minor shall
be promptly advised in writing in a language he understands
of any restrictions imposed upon his release. Id. at 1358.
(3). Any minor taken into custody shall be forthwith afforded an administrative hearing to determine probable cause for
his arrest and the need for any restrictions placed upon his
release. Id. Such hearing shall be held with or without a
request by or on behalf of the minor. Id.
32. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358. .
33. Id. See supra note 31.
34. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358.
35. Id. See supra note 31.
36. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court determined a balancing test should be used to determine whether a hearing was necessary before an individuals' disability benefits were terminated. Id. at 332-335. The balancing test
consisted of three factors:
The first factor was the strength of the private interest, and how it would be affected by the outcome. Id. at 335. The second factor was the risk of erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Id. These two provisions were to be balanced against the third factor, the government's interest, which included the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail. Id.
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than the Gerstein v. Pugh37 requirement of review by a neutral
and detached magistrate requested by the plaintiff class. 3s
The plaintiffs' motion for an en banc ruling claimed the
panel decision majority failed to recognize their fundamental
interest in liberty.89 The Ninth Circuit decided to hear the
case en banc due to the importance of the issues involved,
and the impact of the policy affecting the great number of
children arrested on suspicion of being illegal aliens. 40
III.
A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS

As ALIENS

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the
issue regarding the rights of aliens, ruling that although the
plaintiff class may be illegal aliens they were still entitled to
proof regarding the legality of their detention. 41 The court
cited a well established principle pronouncing any person present in the United States is entitled to equal justice and procedural due process. 42 The court declared that a vital component
of personal liberty is the ability to test the legality of any
direct restraint implemented by the government, guaranteed
37. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein, the Supreme Court
determined that a timely, neutral, detached magistrate was necessary to determine
if probable cause existed to hold a criminal defendant. Id. at 126. This determination
was mandatory to any pretrial detention in the criminal context. Id.
38. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358. But see Flores, 934 F.2d at 1014 (as amended). Judge
Fletcher's dissent described the case as Mamong the most disturbing I have confronted in my years on the court." Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting). ·Children are being held
in detention by the INS for as long as two years in highly inappropriate conditions out
of a professed concern for their welfare." Id. Judge Fletcher was further dismayed by
the process which allowed an INS agent, not a judge, to place children in detention centers which "deprived (the minors) of education, recreation and visitation" and subjected
the minors to being Mcommingled with adults of both sexes and subjected to strip searches with no showing of cause." Id. Judge Fletcher believed the District Court's order
was a Msimple, sensible, minimally intrusive direction to the agency." Id.
39. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358.
40. Id. at 1359.
41. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. Id. at 1359. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981). In Plyler, the Court held
that a state could not deny public education to the children of illegal aliens, without
showing that such a policy furthered a state interest. Id. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court held Fourteenth Amendment due process
provisions to be Muniversal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality; and the equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Id. at 369.
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through the right to seek a habeas corpus writ.4lI The court proclaimed alienage did not prevent a person from testing the
legality of his confinement." Thus, the court ruled the plaintiff class was entitled to proof regarding the legality of their
detention regardless of their alienage. 46
The Ninth Circuit determined the INS could not detain
suspected aliens without a specific exercise of discretion,
such as finding the detained individual would be a menace to
the community, or would pose a risk offlight. 4e In the case at
bar, the court determined that the INS did not demonstrate
a specific reason for the plaintiffs' detention. 47 Therefore,
the court held that the plaintiffs' possessed a fundamental
right, secured by the Constitution, to be free from governmental detention unless a determination was made illustrating the reasons why detention furthered a specific
governmental interest." The court found no such interest in
the case at bar.49
43. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359. "There is no higher duty than to maintain it [the
writ of habeas corpus] unimpaired." (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26
(1939».
44. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359. See Wing Wong v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
In Wing Wong, the Court recognized the Congressional power to expel aliens, but held
a judicial trial was a predicate to such action. Id. "To declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation ofliberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision
were made that the fact of guilt should first be established by a judicial trial." Id. at
237.
45. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892). In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court held that aliens were entitled to habeas corpus
writs. Id. "An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming
authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is
doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful."Id. at 660.
46. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359-1360. See Carlson v. Landon 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
Carlson involved a plaintiff class who was detained on suspicion of being members of
the Communist Party under the Internal Security Act of 1950. Id. at 528. The plaintiffs requested habeas corpus review, challenging their pre-deportation detention on
the ground that it was not proven that they were either a risk to the community, nor
presented a risk of flight. Id. at 529-530. The Supreme Court held that since plaintiffs
were members of the Communist Party, the INS was allowed to detain the plaintiffs.
Id. at 541-542. The Court reasoned that the doctrines and practices of Communism
clearly teach the use of force to achieve political control, thus making the plaintiffs
a menace to the public. Id.
47. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359-1360.
48. Id. at 1360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 states: "The privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.· Id.
49. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1360.
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CHILDREN

The Ninth Circuit then considered the rights of minors. The
INS contended that since the plaintiffs were minors, their
liberty interests were materially different from the adult
detention standard, thus making the INS detention policy
reasonable and appropriate. 50 The court, instead ruled the
Constitution protected the rights of children with due process of law in conjunction with any deprivation of liberty. 51 The
court hypothesized that a minor accused of a criminal offense
may be subject to pretrial detention based on a determination
regarding the safety of the child, but this type of detention decision must be made before a neutral and detached party with
clearly defined justifications for detention. 52 The court reasoned that a minor's freedom from institutional confinement
should be the general rule, and any deviation should be supported by a specific governmental interest. 53
The Ninth Circuit articulated that governmental detention
of children should be used only as a last resort, even when the
governmental purpose is legitimate. 54 The court stressed a
practical need to avoid institutional detention where less
restrictive means were available. 55 It also maintained individual states, not the federal government, were primarily
responsible for child welfare issues, and state courts have
held institutional confinement should be used only when
another type of placement is impossible. 56 Finally, the court
asserted that Congressional policy disfavors the institutionalization of juveniles. 57 Based on these findings, the court proclaimed the age of the plaintiff class should not be used as a
reason for incarceration, and decided the INS erred in its
50. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 1361. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
The Supreme Court held the Constitution demands that minors are entitled to the same
due process rights as adults during judicial stages of a trial. Id.
52. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1361.
53. Id.
54.Id.
55.1d.
56. 1d. See e.g. R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168 (Alaska App. 1986). (states must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that less restrictive alternatives are not possible).
1d. In re John H., 48 A.D.2d 879 (1975) (other options must first be fully explored).
Id.
57. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1361. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §
5035 (regarding pre- disposition detention). See also 18 U.S.C. § 5039 (regarding detention after disposition).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/15

8

Karoly: Immigration Law

1992]

IMMIGRATION LAW

191

contention that the plaintiffs had no fundamental liberty
interest at stake. 58
The Ninth Circuit also contended the INS incorrectly stated the plaintiffs had the burden of finding an express recognition of a substantive due process right either in the
Constitution or in a law interpreting the Constitution in order
to prevail. 59 The court proclaimed that release from detention
was the minor's remedy for the INS' constitutional violation,
not a due process right. 60

C.

GOVERNMENT PURPOSES INVOLVED

The Ninth Circuit recognized the unprecedented nature of
this case, as it involved the detention of people who had not
been convicted of any crime, did not pose a risk of flight, and
did not pose any threat of harm to either themselves or to the
community.61
The INS based their detention policy on two assertions: (1)
the child's interests would be better served by INS detention
than by release to an unrelated responsible adult since the INS
did not have the means to investigate the living environment
of the prospective custodian;62 and (2) the policy of detention
was necessary to protect the INS from criminal and tort liability
if some injury would occur to the child after being released. 63
The court found no legal basis articulated by the INS to validate its detention policy.64 The In re Gault66 decision invalidated
the assumption that the children would be better served by
detention than by release. 66 The court also refuted INS
58. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362.
59.Id.
60.Id.
61. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991). Cf. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In SalerTUJ, the detained party had suspected ties to organized crime, thus posing a risk of flight as well as a potential danger to the community if released by the court. Id. Cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In
Carlson, the detained party was an accused member of the Communist Party thus (in
1950 mentality) posing a threat of harm to the community. Id.
62. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362.
63.Id.
64.Id.
65. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This case declares that children should be treated in a manner least restrictive of their liberty. Id.
66. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362-1363.
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assertions claiming it should be given deferrence for policy decisions. 87 The court determined the INS should be given deferential treatment when its special experience and expertise
are used, but since the INS is not an expert on child welfare,
such deference is not proper. 68 Additionally, the court found the
INS' detention policy to be contrary to Congressional determinations which disfavored institutional confinement ofjuveniles. 89 The court concluded the INS could not unilaterally
determine that blanket detention somehow served the best
interests of the plaintiffs, especially in the absence of affirmative evidence that release would place the child in danger
of some harm.70
The majority decision permitted the INS to make individualized decisions determining whether suspected minor aliens
should be detained,11 ruling that due process required a specific
exercise of discretion in conjunction with the decision to detain
aliens. 72 The court also allowed the INS to judge whether the
minor's proposed guardian would ensure the child's attendance
at future proceedings. 73 Finally, the INS was permitted to determine in each individual instance whether the minor's release
would pose harm to either the minor or to the community.74 The
INS' blanket refusal to make individualized determinations in the
name of administrative expediency, however, was not allowed
by the court.76
The court also disputed the INS' contention that a minor's
release to an unrelated adult could subject the agency to
potential tort or criminal liability, without a home-study analysis of the guardian. 76 The Supreme Court ruled that a state
agency with more expertise in child welfare than the INS,
67. [d. at 1362.
68. [d. The court felt deference should be given to the INS in immigration disputes,
since the INS had special expertise in the field. [d. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976). In Hampton, the court declared it would not defer to agency determination in areas outside of the agency's expertise. [d. at 114-115.
69. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362. See 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (juvenile detention prior to disposition). See also 18 U.S.C. § 5039 (juvenile commitment).
70. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363.
71. [d.
72. [d.

73. [d.
74. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363.
75. [d. See e.g. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Reed Court declared
"administrative convenience does not justify a policy that otherwise runs afoul of the
Constitution." [d. at 76-77.
76. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363.
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was not liable for allowing a child to remain in the custody of
an adult despite evidence the child's safety was in jeopardy.77The court reasoned that by continuing to detain the
plaintiffs, the INS could face greater exposure to liability by
establishing a special custodial relationship with the children. 78
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the first
paragraph of the District Court's order relating to minor alien
release policies. 79 The court concluded the District Court's
order provided the INS with the discretion to make individual decisions on child custody, while disallowing the previous
blanket detention policy.80
D.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The plaintiff class argued for the application of the Gerstein
criminal procedural due process model in this case. 8! The
defendants countered by contending that the Mathews civil procedural due process model should be applied. 82 The court
sidestepped this controversy by holding the plaintiff class'
interest in freedom from detention required that the decision
to detain be made only in conjunction with a neutral and
detached determination ofnecessity.83 The court affirmed part
three of the District Court order, regardless of what procedural due process model was applied. 84 The court ordered the INS
to conduct a detention hearing for suspected alien children
regardless of whether or not one was requested by the alien. 86
77. [d. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989). The Court concluded that the actions of a private citizen could not formulate
a basis ofliability for defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [d. The fact that the child was
previously in state custody did not matter, as the state is not responsible for a person's
welfare simply because it previously held the person in custody. [d. at 201.
78. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In
Youngberg, the Court reasoned that a state may acquire a constitutional duty to ensure
an individual's care by detaining the person in state custody. [d. at 316-317. See also
Lashawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). In Dixon, the court held a
state agency could be possibly liable for a constitutional tort where it fails to provide
adequate safety for children in its custody. [d. at 996.
79. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364. See supra note 31.
80. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364.
81. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra note 37.
82. Flores, 942 F.2d 1352,1365. See supra note 36.
83. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364.
84. [d. See supra note 31.
85. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364.
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This hearing must include an inquiry into whether any non- relative who offers to take custody of the child represents any danger to the child's well-being. s6 The court articulated that
mandatory hearings were necessary since children may not be
capable of understanding their rights. S? Finally, the court
determined that the hearing requirement was reasonable in
light of the private interest at stake. SS
The Ninth Circuit vacated the majority panel decision,
and affirmed the district court order in all respects. 89

E.

DISSENTING OPINION

The dissent agreed with the majority's assertion that plaintiffs were impacted by the INS regulation, and had a right to
86.ld.
87.ld.
88.ld.
89. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1365. See supra note 31.
Tang, J., concurrence. This opinion agreed with the majority, but stressed the
plaintiffs' fundamental right to freedom from governmental detention existing in the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, as well as in the Constitutional guarantee of
habeas corpus. ld. at 1365. This concurrence stressed the idea that physical freedom
from governmental detention was a fundamental right guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.ld. Judge Tang believed the Mathews balancing model
of procedural due process should be used since the proceedings were civil. ld. at
1367. The Mathews test, if applied to this case, favors the plaintiffs' interests over the
INS'. ld. at 1367-1369. Additionally, this opinion believed the due process clause
required the INS to promptly give detained minors an impartial and detached review
of their detention.ld. Judge Tang also emphasized the constitutionality of both the
initial decision to detain, and the conditions imposed upon release after the initial
detention.ld. at 1369-1370.
Norris, J. concurrence. This opinion emphasized the flagrant due process violations by the INS' policy of incarcerating children. ld. at 1370. Judge Norris emphasized that the governmental interests in detention were trivial, and were greatly
outweighed by the liberty issue at stake for the plaintiff class.ld. at 1370-1372.
Rymer, J. partial concurrence and partial dissent. Judge Rymer sought a
constitutionally appropriate balance between the plaintiffs' interests in freedom and
the government's responsibility for the safety of the plaintiffs. ld. at 1372. This
opinion disagreed with the majority's holding that the Constitution requires a minor's
release to any responsible adult who would promise to bring the child back for future
hearings. ld. Judge Rymer sought a narrower holding, yet she would have affirmed
the District Court's summary judgment for the plaintiffs due to the lack of procedural
due process in the INS regulations. ld. This opinion, however, objected to the majority
holding regarding the revision of the release requirement to a responsible adult
party.ld. Judge Rymer believed 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (b)(4), as written, gave the INS the
needed flexibility and afforded greater protection to the plaintiff class, and did not have
to be rewritten.ld. at 1373-1376. Thus, this opinion concurred with the majority that
the process used by the INS in determining release was not constitutionally sufficient,
but Judge Rymer was reluctant to remove the INS hearing officer's discretion. ld. at
1376-1377.
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challenge their detention. 90 The dissent, though, found much
of the majority's discussion irrelevant to what it deemed the
central issues in the case at bar.9t
The dissent objected to the majority's conclusion on the
plaintiffs' liberty right at issue. 92 It perceived the need to
define the liberty right in a much more narrow fashion. 93 The
dissent disputed the majority's characterization of the INS'
detention policy as "blanket detention".94 Alien children were
eligible for release to a number of potential parties, thus the
dissent claimed, the only right the plaintiffs were being denied
was the right to be released to unrelated adults without INS
approva1. 95 The dissent found no precedent in which a court had
ever recognized a fundamental substantive due process right
to a physical liberty. 96 The INS's desire to protect the plaintiffs,
as well as its practical concern to avoid potential liability,
vitiated any substantive due process violation because of the
legitimate ends to which the regulation was rationally related. 97 Therefore, the dissent postulated that minimal scrutiny
should be applied to the INS regulation since no fundamental
right was involved. 9s
The dissent was troubled by the special circumstances of the
case at bar, claiming two factors should influence the constitutional analysis of the INS regulation." First, the court should
focus on the immigration aspect ofthe case, due to the unique
nature of immigration laws. tOO The dissent also claimed the
power over immigration was political, thereby existing in the
legislative and executive branches. tOt Since the judiciary had
90. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1377 (9th. Cir 1991) (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
91. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1377.
92. [d.
93. [d.
94. [d.
95. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1377.
96. [d. at 1378. "The text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individuals against deprivations of liberty simpliciter. It protects them against deprivations
of liberty 'without due process oflaw .... [d. (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring».
97. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1379-1380.
98. [d. at 1380.
99. [d.
100. [d.
101. [d. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). In Fiallo, the Court stressed that
in no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it
is over the admission of aliens. [d. at 792. See also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th
Cir. 1984) "[T]he courts have repeatedly emphasized that the responsibility for regulating the admission of aliens resides in the first instance with Congress. ~ [d. at 965.
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a limited role in immigration, strict scrutiny review should not
apply to an immigration regulation. loa The dissenting opinion
argued the courts should give deference to the INS and only
apply limited judicial review to evaluate the regulation. lOB
Additionally, the dissent maintained that the age of the
plaintiffs should be factored into the court's analysis. lo,
Therefore the INS' regulation was an exercise of governmental power which took into account the need to provide for the
plaintiffs in the absence of parental control. l06
The dissent objected to the majority's conclusion regarding
potential tort liability for the INS should a released minor
become injured. lOG The dissent believed the majority opinion
would make the INS liable to civil claims should a child become
injured while on release to an unrelated adult.lO?
Finally, the dissent stated the case should be remanded for
a determination of the constitutionally required procedures
under the Mathews model of procedural due process, owing to
the potentially sweeping nature of the District Court's order. lOB
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Flores v. Meese
struck down an INS policy of detaining minors suspected of
being illegal aliens when neither a parent nor a legal guardian
was available to assume custody of the child. The court required
the INS to release minor aliens awaiting deportation hearings,
102. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1380.
103. Id. at 1381-1382.
104. Id. at 1383. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). Schall held that a state
may restrict a child's liberty interest to protect the child's welfare. Id. Children were
not presumed to have the capacity to care for themselves, rather they were assumed
to be under parental control, and if parental control faltered, the state had to act as
parents in their place. Id. at 265.
105. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1383.
106. Id. at 1382.
107. Id. The dissent postulated that the majority misinterpreted DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The dissent felt
DeShaney had no bearing on the possibility that the INS will be held liable for releasing alien minors to unrelated adults. The DeShaney Court was careful to emphasize
that the plaintiff could not recover from the state because the state did not create the
danger, and was not liable for not giving aid.Id. at 196-197. The DeShaney Court distinguished that case from one where the state created the danger. Id. Thus, the dissent felt the DeShaney decision could not forecast the possibility oflNS liability for
the il\iuries of minors released to unrelated third parties.Id.
108. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1384-1385.
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who were otherwise eligible for bond release to their parents
or legal guardians, to responsible unrelated adult parties.
The Ninth Circuit also established mandatory hearings for
detained minors before an immigration judge for determination
of the terms and conditions of release. The court permitted the
INS to require a written guarantee from the proposed custodian
promising the child's appearance at deportation hearings. The
court allowed the INS to make detention decisions on a case by
case basis to protect the safety of both the minor and the public. The INS' blanket detention policy of minors who did not
have an available parent nor legal guardian available to accept
custody was ruled unconstitutional. The liberty rights of the
aliens outweighed the governmental interest when detention
served no legitimate governmental purpose.
Richard A. Karoly'
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